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Abstract—Human flourishing is often severely limited by per-
sistent violence. Quantitative conflict research has found common
temporal [1], [2] and other statistical patterns in warfare [3],
but very little is understood about its general spatial patterns.
While the importance of topology in geostrategy has long been
recognized [4], [5], the role of spatial patterns in determining
a region’s vulnerability to conflict is not well understood. Here,
we use network science to show that global patterns in war and
peace are closely related to the relative position of cities in a
global interaction network. We find that regions with between-
ness centrality above a certain threshold are often engulfed in
entrenched conflict, while a high degree correlates with peace.
In fact, betweenness accounts for over 80% of the variance in
number of attacks. This metric is also a good predictor of the
distance to a conflict zone and can estimate the risk of conflict.
We conjecture that a high betweenness identifies areas with
fuzzy cultural boundaries [6], whereas high degree cities are in
cores where peace is more easily maintained. This is supported
by a simple agent-based model in which cities influence their
neighbours, which exhibits the same threshold behaviour with
betweenness as seen in conflict data. These findings not only shed
new light on the causes of violence, but could be used to estimate
the risk associated with actions such as the merging of cities,
construction of transportation infrastructure, or interventions in
trade or migration patterns.
I. INTRODUCTION
Conflict has strong spatial components that are not fully
understood and cannot be explained by current modeling tech-
niques. Whilst war-torn countries face common socioeconomic
and geopolitical challenges, different regions experiences dif-
ferent orders of magnitude in violence. This paper presents
an elegant network science framework for understanding the
role of global spatial interactions on local violence intensity.
Throughout history, most violent incidents have been between
culturally or ethnically distinct groups [7], [8]. Whilst cultural
diversity does not in itself cause violence, it can exasperate
existing vulnerabilities, especially when there are neighbour-
ing forces with competing interests [9]. In particular, conflicts
have been observed to occur at fuzzy cultural boundaries
that nest between coherent cultural groups [6], [10]–[12].
Whilst data can be collected on ethnolinguistic and cultural
fractionalization [13], understanding the interaction forces that
support fuzzy cultural boundaries can provide mechanisms to
mitigate violence in the long term. One way of collecting data
on cultural communities is through social interaction networks
[14], and interaction networks between communities have been
used to model the projection of cultural influence/threat [15].
However, although it is known that physical geography under-
pins community formation and influence/threat projection in
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Fig. 1. Complex network of cities and cultural interaction links. a-
i) Cities’ spatial location is used to form an interaction network via the
gravity law and a hard-disk constraint - the links enable the flow of cultural
influence, a-ii) Top-down network model can detect high betweenness cities
using shortest-path energy propagation, and a-iii) Bottom-up agent simulations
can reveal fuzzy culture boundary cities and cohesive culture cores. The high
betweenness metric relates to fuzzy culture and high degree relates to cohesive
cultured cities. b) Global interaction network of cities v ∈ V (colour indicates
country and size indicates population). c) Example of high degree cities (size
∝ D(v)) in Europe, which are far from any major conflicts. d) Examples of
high betweenness cities (size ∝ B(v)) in the Middle East, which are close
to major conflicts and international terrorist groups.
conflicts [4], [14], there is no universal model able to quantify
the role of spatial patterns in war and peace.
In this study, we consider both non-state terrorism and
conventional warfare from 2002 to 2014, for which there is
spatially accurate reporting of violent events. We use a simple
connectivity law to connect neighbouring cities as a proxy for
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multiplexed interactions. We go on to show that the spatial
network of cities is closely related to violence, and propose a
simple model to account for the phenomenon.
II. RESULTS
Using the spatial data from city locations worldwide, we
infer a global interaction network via the gravity law, as
shown in Fig. 1a-i (see Methods-B). This top-down network
abstraction uses shortest-path energy propagation (Fig. 1a-ii
– see Methods-C) to mirror the complex culture interactions
simulated by the bottom-up agent-based model (Fig. 1a-iii
– see Methods-D). We use two standard network measures:
degree D (number of neighbouring connected cities) and
betweenness B (number of shortest paths which pass through
the city in question).
We find a robust empirical relationship between conflict
and network measures: high degree cities are peaceful and
far from the nearest conflict zones, whereas high betweenness
cities are often engulfed in persistent violence. Strikingly, there
is a threshold effect such that only cities above a certain
betweenness are at risk. These results seem consistent with
the interpretation that dense cores of high degree nodes in the
network correspond to culturally cohesive regions, while high
betweenness nodes (which usually link such cores) signify
fuzzy cultural boundaries associated with violence. Examples
of the highest degree cities are in Western Europe and are
far from the nearest conflict zones (Fig. 1c). Examples of the
highest betweenness cities are in the Middle East, and have
experienced high levels of terrorism and conventional violence
(Fig. 1d). A simple agent-based model of cities which can
adopt different states (cultures) and exert an influence on the
states of their neighbours reinforces this view: a similar pattern
arises, such that nodes in the cores maintain their states while
those above a threshold of betweenness tend to flip at high
frequency from state to state.
A. Top-Down Network Results
Conflicts often occur across regions which include several
cities. We therefore group cities into small zones z, each
covering 0.5% of the global land surface area (500km radius).
Fig. 2 shows scatter plots of the number of terrorist attacks
A(z) against the network metrics, with panel plots for both
the probability of being a major conflict zone, and the distance
to the nearest major conflict zone. A major conflict zone
is one that experiences persistent conflict, which is defined
as having suffered over 100 attacks between 2002 and 2014
(equivalent to at least 78% of the years being under attack
– see Supplementary Information (SI)). Isolated high profile
terrorist attacks (e.g. 9/11 in New York and 7/7 in London)
do not necessarily indicate major conflict zones. This is
because the death-toll variance for individual attacks depends
on certain on-the-day factors, which do not reflect the general
level of threat faced by a region (Fig. 2k).
1) Degree and Betweenness Centrality: The results for de-
gree and betweenness centrality indicate a threshold behaviour,
whereby if the zone has high degree (D(z) > 104 links – see
Fig. 2a-c) or low betweenness (B(z) < 107 shortest paths
– see Fig. 2d-f), then there are very few attacks (<1/year).
Conversely, if the zone has low degree (D(z) < 104) or high
betweenness (B(z) > 107), then there is a high probability
that the zones will experience major conflict (see Fig. 2a-
f). We also show that the average distance from any zone to
the nearest top-100 major conflict zone rises with increasing
degree. High degree zones are at least 1200 km away from
the nearest conflict zone, whereas high betweenness zones are
usually less than 150 km away.
2) Strategic Centrality: In order to further refine the sta-
tistical prediction of conflict, we define the strategic cen-
trality of a zone z as S(z) = B(z)D(z) , which normalizes the
betweenness of a city by its number of neighbours. It captures
the path importance of a city, since a low degree means
fewer alternative paths. The results indicate that zones with a
high strategic centrality suffer both a high number of attacks
and a dispassionately high mortality rate (see Fig. 2g-i).
The relationship again displays a threshold effect, which can
nevertheless be approximated quite well with a power law
for the purpose of prediction. The best-fit power law for the
number of attacks A∗ with respect to the strategic centrality
of zones is given by log10(A
∗(z)) ' a log10 S(z) + b, where
the parameters are a = 4 and b = −9. The corresponding
adjusted R-squared value is 0.82 for the top 250 populated
zones. Different logistic regression algorithms can increase the
R-squared value to 0.92, but it is worth noting that the linear
regression is only to serve as a demonstration of predictive
powers and not as an essential element of the network model
itself. In general, the results show that strategic centrality is a
better predictor of conflict than either degree or betweenness.
A low strategic centrality zone (S(z) < 104) will experience
almost no attacks. On the other hand, high strategic centrality
zones (S(z) > 104) are on average less than 50 km away from
the nearest major conflict zone. A summary of the findings
can be found in the table in Fig. 2l. To demonstrate the wider
applicability of the approach to conventional conflicts (approx.
150 over the time period compared to 30,000 terrorist and
insurgency attacks), Fig. 2j shows conventional battle death-
toll vs. strategic centrality, demonstrating a similar threshold
behaviour.
To confirm that these results are not spurious, we perform
two analyses (see SI). First, we show that similar statistical
results to Fig. 2 for different zone sizes and flow weights,
demonstrating model robustness. Second, we show that the
network centrality metrics presented here are not proxies
of key geopolitical or socioeconomic metrics. The results
indicate that strategic centrality is a far superior predictor
of conflict (adjusted R2 = 0.51) than any established geo-
political or socioeconomic metric considered here (adjusted
R2 = 0.00−0.13) and strategic centrality itself is not related to
any of these indicators (adjusted R2 = 0.01−0.30). The results
show that zones and their cities that are simply near the equator
or between densely populated sub-continents do not always
have a high betweenness or strategic centrality. Simplified
country or county/state connection maps are therefore not as
informative as city level network descriptions. The metrics
developed in this paper cannot be obtained without considering
the city network, and do not appear to be direct proxies for
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Fig. 2. Scatter plot of number of attacks versus the network metrics of the top populated zones z; with smaller panel plots on the probability of
suffering a major attack and the distance distribution to the nearest major conflict site. Subplots are divided in accordance to the top 250, 500, and
1000 populated zones (representing 15%, 27%, and 45% of the total modelled population). The colour gradient of the scatter plots indicate the mortality
rate, with darker spots indicating a disproportionately higher mortality rate. Subplots a)-c) show the threshold relationship for the degree of a zone and the
number of attacks – high degree (D(z) > 104) experiences almost no attacks and is > 1200 km away from the nearest major conflict. Subplots d)-f) show
the threshold relationship for the betweenness of a zone – high betweenness (B(z) > 107) has a high probability of major conflict (P (A(z) > 100) >0.7),
and is close to existing conflict zones (<150 km). Combining degree and betweenness, we propose strategic centrality S(z) = B(z)/D(z). Subplots g)-i)
show the relationship between the strategic centrality and the number of attacks. The results indicate a strong correlation (R2 <0.82). A zone with high
strategic centrality has a high probability of being in major conflict (P (A(z) > 100) >0.7) and is close to existing conflict zones (<50 km). Subplot j) shows
conventional battle death-toll vs. strategic centrality, demonstrating a similar threshold behaviour. Mortality rates can be found in subplot k) and a summary
of the findings can be found in subplot l).
established socioeconomic or geo-political metrics.
3) Effect of Cities Merging or Fragmenting: We further
expand the analysis by considering how different aspects
of city development would affect strategic centrality. We
consider a high betweenness city that connects M cohesive
city cores, each with N cities (see Methods-C and Fig. 5).
Its strategic centrality is therefore proportional to (M − 1)N .
If the high betweenness city fragments from 1 to K smaller
cities, its strategic centrality S(v) decreases in proportion to
(M − 1)N/2K, suggesting that the emergence of new cities
around existing high betweenness cities, with connecting links
to the cohesive cores, would effectively reduce vulnerability
to conflict.
B. Bottom-Up Agent-Based Simulation Results
The empirical results described above suggest that cities
exert an influence on their neighbours, and that geography
can determine to a large extent whether a city will converge
in some way with its neighbours, or find itself torn between
competing influences. In order to study this mechanism, we
propose a simple bottom-up agent-based model (ABM). This
is an extension of a model previously used to show how
governments can influence each other with a view to achieving
global cooperation on issues such as climate change [16]. We
assume that each city is characterized at each moment by a
’state’, which could represent the reigning government or the
dominant culture. Cities are connected by a spatial network,
as in the empirical case above, and each city has the capacity
to influence the states of its neighbours. This influence, which
might represent cultural diffusion or military threat, is such
that a city will tend to make its neighbours adopt the same
state as itself.
Each city’s capacity Ci to project influence scales linearly
with its population and inversely with the number of neigh-
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Fig. 3. Agent-Based-Model (ABM) of cities that culturally influence each
other through the spatial network. In subplot a), we illustrate how two
cities with culture A, and one city with culture C, exert a strong influence on
an in-between city with culture B; whilst that city exert weaker influences in
return. In subplot b), we show Monte Carlo simulation results for the agent-
based model (ABM), where average flip rate is plotted against betweenness;
we can observe that many cities above a threshold of betweenness have a
high flip rate. In subplot c), we show that the initial conditions assign each
city a random culture; and, in subplot d), cohesive culture cores are formed
with fuzzy cultural boundaries (high culture flip rate).
bours currently in different states to itself (see Fig. 3a). At
each time step of the simulation, cities update their states
according to the sum influence towards each possible state.
This model is similar to others used to study social interaction,
such as Axelrod’s model for the dissemination of culture [17],
or the well-known voter model [18]. The main difference is
that in our model each agent must divide its influence among
all neighbours not in the same state, which is more realistic
for the case of interacting cities.
At the beginning of the simulation, each city is assigned
a random state (see Fig. 3c). Over time their states are
updated under each other’s influence until the whole network
converges to quasi-stationarity, such that only a few states
exist, each occupying a culturally cohesive core of nodes (see
Fig. 3d). Such spatial patterns have been observed in empirical
studies of human culture [14]. In between the aforementioned
cohesive cores there exist isolated cities that constantly flip
between different states, akin to fuzzy cultural boundaries (see
red boxes in Fig. 3d). A city’s flip rate (i.e. the number of
state changes per simulation iteration) can be interpreted as
the magnitude of the tension attempting to change a city’s
culture or government. We find that the flip rate correlates
strongly with betweenness B(v). Moreover, the modularity (a
measure of how well-defined a network’s community structure
is) associated with the clusters of equal state cities increases
rapidly during the initial transient period and then settles at
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Fig. 4. High population zones that are either in existing persistent violence
(red labels) or are vulnerable to future violence (yellow labels). In sub-plot
a), we identify outliers zones that have a low number of attacks compared
with peer zones with a similar level of strategic centrality. In the table, the
current number of attacks accumulated in each zone A(z) between 2002 to
2014 is presented along side the predicted number of attacks A∗(z). Three
major areas of vulnerability have been identified: b) Saudi Arabia and Iran,
c) southwestern China, and d) Central Americas.
close to unity, indicating that the model detects the natural
communities in the network. This is consistent with other
dynamical models which have been found to reflect com-
munity structure in the same way [19], [20]. Despite this
model’s simplicity, the fact that it displays the same threshold
relationship between activity and betweenness as we have
observed empirically supports the conjecture that it is the
formation of fuzzy cultural boundaries between cohesive cores
which mediates human conflict.
C. Predictions
One application of the model is to identify high risk areas
that are currently relatively peaceful. Fig. 4 highlights cities
whose strategic centrality predicts a significantly higher num-
ber of terrorist attacks than currently experienced as of 2015
(Fig. 4a). Two major geographic areas have been identified
(yellow labels): i) Saudi Arabia, Iran, Turkey (Fig. 4b), and
ii) southwestern China (Fig. 4c). Of particular interest is Saudi
Arabia, which is surrounded by several major existing conflict
zones, i.e. Yemen, Syria and Iraq (red labels). Fig. 4d shows
that the prediction algorithm is also accurate for the American
continent, where persistent violence between international
criminal organizations dominates the genre of conflict. Island
networks with a violent history such as Northern Ireland and
the Southern Philippines can be detected as high strategic
centrality by analyzing the surrounding islands as isolated
interconnected sub-networks. Using this method of prediction,
74% of the terrorist attacks in 2016 occurred within 50km of
the high betweenness cities.
D. Discussion
Tolstoy once remarked that “individuals struggle between
necessity and free-will, and the sum of individuals amounts
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to a general collective behaviour, which can explain war and
peace.” We have shown that the collective behaviour can
be modeled as as global spatial interaction of our cities,
and is statistically related to human violence. In particular,
the bottlenecks of a global network of cities often display
persistent conflict. We conjecture that this empirical pattern
ensues from the fact that such bottlenecks often correspond
to the “fuzzy cultural boundaries” identified in the conflict
literature as risk factors. To test this hypothesis we propose a
simple agent-based model of cities which can influence each
other to adopt the same state as themselves (where states might
represent the particular culture or government of the city). And
indeed, in this model the cities in the cohesive cores of the
network settle down to a single state, whereas the bottlenecks
continue flipping indefinitely between states. In fact, the flip-
rate exhibits the same threshold relationship to betweenness
centrality as the number of attacks do in the conflict data.
Together, these results support the view that human vio-
lence is related to fuzzy cultural boundaries, which in turn
reflect structural features of a network of interactions between
populations. This is in keeping with previous findings: on the
one hand, with the notion that fuzzy cultural boundaries cause
ethno/cultural conflicts [6] (see Fig. 2a-i); and on the other,
with the fact that conventional battles take place in central
locations as in Mackinder’s The Pivot of History geopolitical
theory [4], [5], [21] (see Fig. 2j). However, while our agent-
based model suggests that cultural interaction of some kind
is the most likely mechanism behind the empirical findings,
other potential causal explanations should not be dismissed
out of hand.
Whilst it is true that the distribution of cities in any given
region might be the result of complex historical dynamics, we
should mention that the spatial bottlenecks are the result of
intricate interactions among the whole connected world (i.e.
the model loses predictive power when only a subset of nodes
is considered). The statistical accuracy of our spatial network
model does not in itself reveal causality, even if it serves
as an elegant way of capturing the effects of such complex
historical dynamics. However, unless history has caused both
ancient and new cities to form in a particular spatial pattern
leading to the observed close relationship between a city
network and violence, it seems more likely that the simple
cultural interaction model presented in the paper does indeed
describe at least one dominant mechanism at work. But other
mechanisms linking civilization-level network structure and
ground-level human interactions should also be explored.
As urban population grows, the emergence of new
cities, transport links, and other connected infrastructures
and international trade networks [22] as interdependent
multiplexed networks presents humanity with an opportunity
to improve topological resilience. Dynamic effects such as
mass human migration as a response to war and climate
change [23] also deserve attention, and we encourage others
to investigate more deeply the role of spatial networks in the
hope of informing policies and interacting with the politics
of anthropocentric resilience.
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III. MATERIAL AND METHODS
A. Background to Conflict Modeling
Human conflict in one guise or another has shaped our
world, enthralled historians for millennia, and continues to
represent an existential threat to humanity. Here we focus
on modeling modern conflict, including both terrorism and
conventional warfare. Whilst machine predictors are unlikely
to ever replace human experience and judgment, quantitative
models are useful for producing risk assessments, aid decision
making, and testing hypotheses.
The quantitative models can be broadly divided into two
categories. In the first category, statistical approaches can
observe common ecological patterns [3], [24], and both long-
term cyclic patterns [2], [7], [25] and short-term self-excitation
mechanisms [26] have been well investigated. By training
machine-learning algorithms on historical patterns, accurate
predictions (70-80%) on new emerging conflicts can be made.
Such algorithms are used by commercial (e.g. Parus Analytics)
and government (e.g. US Department of Defence - Integrated
Crisis Early Warning System) organizations. However, the
underlying algorithms are sensitive to data availability, lack
detailed quantitative mechanisms for sociopolitical hypotheses
testing, and as such find it difficult to provide solutions. In the
second category, Agent-Based Models (ABM) has the benefit
of being able to simulating the impact of specific sociopolitical
causal mechanisms, such as culture clashes [6], climate change
[1], or technology transfer [27]. However, ABMs require
detailed configurations for each geographic region, and are
often too complex for creating a universal understanding of
conflict. It is also worth mentioning spatial interaction models
that sit in between the aforementioned approaches [28], and
have proven predictive power in a variety of topics including
threat projection between conflicting parties [29]. Despite the
accuracy of these modelling approaches, there lacks a bridge
between them.
B. Data Set and Network Construction
The paper leverages on the following open data sets:
1) City data: 7322 cities with their latitude, longitude, and
population data from National Geospatial Intelligence
Agency 1. The geospatial data includes cities that vary
in population from mega-cities (several millions) to
small towns. The data represents ≈25% of the world’s
total population and it includes over 2800 cities with
a population over 100,000, yielding a sufficiently high
city resolution. For the purpose of this paper, we shall
call all settlements cities. Each city is also tagged with
its country and province affiliation.
2) Conflict data: two data sets are used, (1) terrorism and
insurgency violence, and (2) conventional warfare. For
terrorism and insurgency violence: the Global Terrorism
Database (GTD) [31] database is used, with over 30,000
conflict incidents between 2002 to 2014. The GTD
contains the number of attacks and death-toll, ranging
1The dataset has been improved with population data and can be found at
[30]
from small-scale assassinations (1 death) to large-scale
massacres (1000s dead). Most of the death-toll data is
time stamped and geo-tagged (longitude and latitude).
The GTD data is further processed to: (i) fill in any
missing longitude and latitude information, (ii) remove
attacks with unknown location information (less than
1%), and (iii) cluster the number of attacks and death-toll
data to the nearest city in the geospatial data set (mean
distance 27km). For conventional warfare: the PRIO -
Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP) database is used
[32], with over 150 conventional battles. Most of the
battles are tagged with the location. Further manual geo-
tagging of GPS location was performed by the authors.
3) Geopolitical and socioeconomic data: the 2014 GDP per
capita and income inequality data from the World Bank
and the International Monetary Fund, and the democracy
index developed by the Economist Intelligence Unit
(EIU).
The aim of this paper is to develop an approximate global
interaction model based on land connections between cities. It
is well established that the interaction weight between cities
(i.e., transport flow volume) can be approximately measured
by the gravity law. The general equation states that the
symmetrical flow between two cities i and j is proportional to
the population of the two cities P and inversely proportional to
the square of the Euclidean distance d, such that: Fij =
PiPj
dij2
[33], [34] (see Supplementary Information (SI) for further
justification). As this would potentially create a land route
between any two cities worldwide, we add a hard-disk radius
of 500km as the constraint for the longest land route between
any two settlements. This way, a multi-hop interaction network
is created. Two further constraints are put in place: a) eliminate
sea travel (> 50km), and b) in order to only consider major
links and cities, we only consider cities with a population over
10,000 people, which are less sensitive to population changes
(83% of all cities in the data set). The latter 2 constraints are
not strictly necessary to achieve similar statistical results. As
a result, a global multi-hop interaction network is constructed
(see Fig. 1b).
C. Top-Down Complex Network Analysis
As conflicts often happen over an area involving multiple
cities, we are interested in the properties of a zone z. We
define a zone as an area that has many cities, i.e., v ∈ Vz .
In the main paper, the results are presented for circular zones
of 500km in radius, each representing 0.5% of the modeled
global land surface area. Overlap of the zones is permitted and
each zone is centred on a particular city. The paper is firstly
interested in two primary measures in network science: degree
and betweenness. A city’s degree is defined as the number of
links with neighbouring cities, D(v) = deg(v). The degree is
unweighted to highlight the importance of the number of links
(neighbours), as opposed to the importance of the neighbours
or links. The total degree property of a zone z is defined as
the sum of all the degree values of each city inside the zone
(number of links inside a zone), i.e., D(z) =
∑
v∈Vz D(v).
Interaction routes often travel the shortest multi-hop path
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between a number of cities. Betweenness measures the number
of shortest paths through a node (i.e., city). The shortest path
of travelling between a city m to any other city n is defined
as the path with the least number of hops. The unnormalised
betweenness of a city Bv is defined as the number of shortest
paths that pass through this city:
B(v) =
∑
m 6=n 6=v
σmn(v), (1)
where σm,n(v) is the shortest path between m and n that goes
through city i. The total betweenness property of a zone z is
defined as the sum of all the betweenness values of each city
inside the zone (number of shortest paths that pass through
the zone), i.e., B(z) =
∑
v∈Vz B(v). Unlike the unweighted
degree, we are interested in the weight contribution of each
link. This is because multi-hop interaction routes are likely to
consider a balance between: i) the shortest path, and ii) one
that also passes through major cities for increased profit (i.e.,
attracted to population P ). For the weighted network, one
can define the weight of each link between 2 arbitrary cities
i and j as inversely proportional to the expected flow value
[35]:
wij = F
−θ
ij , (2)
where Fij is the flow value and θ = [0, 1] can offer full
weighting (θ = 1) or no weighting (θ = 0). For example,
if the flow weight of a link is high, then the weight of the
link (for shortest path calculation) is negligibly small and
there is no minimum or maximum link weight. In this paper’s
main analysis and results section, we have selected to present
the results for a balanced weighted betweenness centrality
measure (θ = 0.5), such that a balance exists between the
weight of a link and the number of links. Nonetheless, we
present the results for θ = 0 (no weighting) and θ = 1
(full weighting) in the SI to demonstrate the robustness of
the methodology.
The strategic centrality for a zone z as S(z) = B(z)D(z) , which
normalises the betweenness of a city by the number of links. It
is a measure of the number of shortest paths per link connected
to a city (similar to link betweenness that is used to measure
the importance of road networks [36]). A city with a high
betweenness will have global interaction importance, while
a low degree (more isolated) will increase its vulnerability to
conflict. Let us consider a simple problem: what happens to the
degree and betweenness properties of the relay nodes, when
the number of relay nodes K changes. Let us at first consider
a single relay node v in a zone z (scenario (a) in Fig. 5). The
degree of the node or the zone is D1(v) = D1(z) = 2N if
the relay node is connected to all N nodes in the cores. The
betweenness of the node or the zone is B1(v) = B1(z) = N2,
if every shortest path passes through the relay node. Consider
now the case the single node fragmenting into K relay nodes
- see scenario (b), the degree value of each node becomes
DK(v) = D1 + (K − 1), of which there are K in the
zone (i.e., D(z) = KD(v)). As for the betweenness, one
needs to consider the average value across all relay nodes
in the zone, as each single relay node will have a different
number of shortest paths that pass through it. In total, the
Core 1 (N Nodes) Core 2 (N Nodes)
1 relay node in zone z
S1 = B1/D1
= (M-1)N/2
Fragmentation into K
identical connected 
relay nodes in zone z
a
b
K relay nodes in zone z
SK = B1/K(D1+K-1) 
≈(M-1)N/2K
v
v
Fig. 5. A graph showing K relay nodes connecting M cores, each with
N nodes. Scenario (a) shows a single relay node and Scenario (b) shows it
fragmented into K relay nodes. The solid lines indicate the shortest path and
the dashed lines indicate other paths (not shortest). Each relay node in a zone
of K relay nodes has a degree DK(v) = MN + K − 1, a betweenness
BK(v) =
(M
2
)
N2/K, and a strategic centrality SK ≈ MN/2K. In
terms of cities, fragmentation of one city into many cities will reduce the
betweenness and strategic centrality of any individual city and hence reduce
its attraction to militants (i.e., fewer interaction routes). Fragmentation will
also increase the number of neighbours and its degree, which reduces its
vulnerability.
same BK(z) = B1 shortest paths pass through K relay nodes
in zone z. Hence, the average betweenness in the relay nodes
is E[BK(v)] = BK(z) = B1K . Note, no shortest paths between
relay nodes exist, as all relay nodes are directly connected to
each other. Strategic centrality is the same for each node and
for the whole zone: SK(v) = SK(z) =
E[BK ]
DK
= B1K(D1+K−1) .
More generally, if there are M cores, each with N nodes, the
degree of a relay node is:
DK(v) =MN + (K − 1), (3)
and the betweenness of a relay node is:
BK(v) =
(
M
2
)
N2
K
. (4)
Therefore, the strategic centrality of the K interconnecting
relay nodes is
SK =
(
M
2
)
N2
K(MN +K − 1) ≈ (M − 1)
N
2K
, (5)
for a larger number of core nodes compared to the relay nodes
(N  K). Therefore, increasing the number of relay nodes K
will reduce the strategic importance of any one relay node, and
increasing the number of core nodes (M − 1)N will increase
the relay nodes’ strategic importance. The strategic centrality
analysis is equally applicable on the individual node v level
as well as the zone z level.
D. Bottom-Up Agent-Based Simulation
We model individual people behaving as a collective group
when they share a common culture [37]. We consider cities
in a network with adjacency matrix {Aij}. We also define a
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number of distinctive cultural states, and at any given time t,
each city can be in any of S states: si(t) = {1, 2, 3...Q}.
We now model the willingness for the people in cities to
influence other cities that it is connected to. The agent-based-
model (ABM) simulates the cultural influence interaction
between cities, with each city exerting its cultural influence
to neighbouring cities until they agree on a common culture.
This approach has been used before in a variety of ways,
including fostering cooperation [16]. The steps in methodology
and analysis for the ABM is listed below.
Step 1 - No. of Dissimilar Neighbours: A way to define the
number of connected cities with different cultures is: ni(t) =∑
j Aij [1−δsi(t),sj(t)], where δsi(t),sj(t) is the Kronecker delta
function (i.e., dsi(t),sj(t) = 1 only if the cultures are identical
si(t) = sj(t)).
Step 2 - Projection of Cultural Influence: We assume
that each city has a finite capacity to exert influence to
neighbouring cities with a different culture. This capacity
Cj could be related to total population, military strength,
wealth...etc. In this paper, we assume it scales linearly with
population. As such, the amount of influence fj is shared
amounts the nj connected cities with different cultures such
that:
fj =
Cj
nj(t)
. (6)
As such, city i is influenced by culture from neighbouring
cities j that have a culture sj = q. The weight of this cultural
influence is:
hqi (t) =
∑
j
Aijδq,sj(t)fj . (7)
Step 3 - Adoption of a Culture: Due to the influence, city
i will adopt a culture q at time t+ 1 with probability:
P (si → c) ∝ [hqi (t)]r, (8)
where r can be seen as a rationality factor. Low rationality
(r = 0) leads to random cultural adoption and high rationality
leads to switching to the cultural state q with the strongest
influence hqi (t).
Step 4 - Monte Carlo Simulation: This simulation starts
with populating each city uniformly and randomly, and then
connecting them according to the hard disk radius. The edges
of the simulation are spatially wrapped to remove boundary
effects. At the start, each city has a random distinctive culture
and converges after some time to form culturally cohesive
city cores (see Fig. 1a-iii). Yet, there are many cities that do
not converge on a singular culture and flips between multiple
cultures, or can otherwise be seen to be part of a fuzzy culture
boundary (see Fig. 1a-iii). The process is repeated until results
converge.
Step 5 - Analysis: As reflected in the results (see Fig. 3b),
the cities that converge on a high cultural flip rate also have
high network betweenness B(v) and the cities that converge to
a cohesive culture with its neighbours also have a high degree
D(v).
